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ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA
SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Abstract. The connected uniformly-hyperstable sets
of a ﬁnite game are shown to be precisely the essential
components of Nash equilibria.
1. Introduction
The concept of equilibrium proposed by Nash [1, 2] is a
cornerstone of game theory. He deﬁned an equilibrium as a
proﬁle of players’ strategies such that each is an optimal reply
to others’ strategies. Most games have multiple equilibria so
his deﬁnition is not a complete theory of rational play. Hillas
and Kohlberg [3] survey reﬁnements that impose additional
decision-theoretic criteria. Nash also showed that a game’s
equilibria are the ﬁxed points of an associated map (i.e. a
continuous function) from the space of strategies into itself,
and in algebraic topology too, reﬁnements select ﬁxed points
with stronger properties.
Here we establish for ﬁnite games an exact equivalence be-
tween a game-theoretic reﬁnement and a topological reﬁne-
ment. The game-theoretic reﬁnement is the uniform variant
of Kohlberg and Mertens’ [4] deﬁnition of a hyperstable com-
ponent of equilibria of a game (this and other technical terms
are deﬁned below). The topological reﬁnement is O’Neill’s [5]
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deﬁnition of an essential component of ﬁxed points of a map.
Basically, Theorem 1.1 below shows that the space of per-
turbed games considered in the deﬁnition of hyperstability
is as rich as the class of perturbed maps considered in the
deﬁnition of essentiality.
Any map whose ﬁxed points are the equilibria is called a
Nash map for the game. Govindan and Wilson [6] prove for
2-player games that within the set of Nash maps that are
continuous in payoﬀs as well as strategies, between every two
Nash maps there is a homotopy that preserves ﬁxed points;
our extension to N-player games has not been published. Sim-
ilarly Demichelis and Germano [7] show that the topological
index, and thus also the topological essentiality, of an equilib-
rium component is independent of the map used. Here, in x2
and Appendix A we show that in fact the index depends only
on the local degree of the projection map from the equilib-
rium graph to the space of games. Therefore, hereafter we say
that an equilibrium component is essential if it is an essential
component of the ﬁxed points of some Nash map, and thus
all Nash maps. The restriction to components of equilibria is
immaterial for extensive-form games with perfect recall and
generic payoﬀs since for such games all equilibria in a compo-
nent induce the same probability distribution over outcomes
(Kreps and Wilson [8]; Govindan and Wilson [9]). The fol-
lowing paragraphs review deﬁnitions of the two reﬁnements.
Essential Components of Fixed Points. Let X be the
space of maps f : X ! X from/into a topological space X,
where X is endowed with the compact-open topology. Given
f 2 X, a component is a maximal connected set of its ﬁxed
points. A component K is topologically essential if for each
neighborhood U of K there is a neighborhood V of f such
that each map in V has a ﬁxed point in U. In this article the
focus is on the case that X is the space of proﬁles of players’ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 3
mixed strategies and f is a Nash map of a game. (In x2 the
space X is denoted Σ and it is a compact convex subset of
RS with the `1 norm.)
Uniformly Hyperstable Components of Equilibria. Hy-
perstability invokes two principles. ‘Hyper’ refers to the ax-
iom of Invariance, which requires that a reﬁnement should be
immune to treating a mixed strategy as an additional pure
strategy. This excludes presentation eﬀects by ensuring that
equivalent equilibria are selected in equivalent games. Stabil-
ity requires that every nearby game has a nearby equilibrium.
Here a nearby game is one with players’ payoﬀs in a neigh-
borhood of those of the given game, represented as a point
in Euclidean space with the `1 norm (we use the `1 norm
throughout). Invariance and Stability are applied as follows.
Equivalence of Games and Strategies. Two strategies of
one player are equivalent if they yield every player the same
expected payoﬀ for each proﬁle of others’ strategies. A pure
strategy is redundant if the player has another strategy that
is equivalent. From a game G one obtains its reduction G¤
by deleting redundant pure strategies until none remain; the
reduction is unique (apart from names of pure strategies).
Two games are equivalent if their reductions are the same. If
¾ is a proﬁle of players’ strategies in G then its reduction ¾¤
is the proﬁle of equivalent strategies of G¤. For each set C
of strategy proﬁles for game G the corresponding set C0 for
an equivalent game G0 consists of the proﬁles of equivalent
strategies.
Hyperstability and Uniform Hyperstability. A closed set C
of equilibria of game G is hyperstable if for every neighborhood
U0 of the equivalent set C0 of equilibria for any equivalent
game G0 there exists a neighborhood V 0 of G0 such that every
game in V 0 has an equilibrium in U0. A stronger variant is: A
closed set C of equilibria of G is uniformly hyperstable if for4 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
every neighborhood U of C there exists ± > 0 such that every
±-perturbation of every equivalent game G0 has an equilibrium
equivalent to some strategy proﬁle in U.
x2 establishes notation and then x3 proves:
Theorem 1.1. The connected uniformly hyperstable sets are
the essential components of any Nash map of the game.
As mentioned above, essential for some Nash map implies
essential for every Nash map of the game.1
Theorem 1.1 is proved in two parts: an essential compo-
nent is uniformly hyperstable, Theorem 3.1; a connected uni-
formly hyperstable set is an essential component, Theorem
3.2. An implication of Theorem 1.1 is that a component is
uniformly hyperstable iﬀ its topological index is nonzero. In-
dependently, von Schemde [10] establishes this result for 2-
player outside-option games. Appendices A and B provide
technical tools.
2. Formulation
We consider games with a ﬁnite set N of players, jNj > 2.
Each player n 2 N has a ﬁnite set Sn of pure strategies.
Interpret a pure strategy sn as a vertex of player n’s sim-
plex Σn = ∆(Sn) of mixed strategies. The sets of proﬁles of
pure and mixed strategies are S =
Q
n Sn and Σ =
Q
n Σn.
For player n, S¡n =
Q
m6=n Sm and Σ¡n =
Q
m6=n Σm de-
note the sets of proﬁles of others’ pure and mixed strate-
gies. Given N and S, each game G is described by its pay-
oﬀ function ˆ G : S ! RN from proﬁles of pure strategies
to players’ payoﬀs. Thus a game is speciﬁed by a point in
1An analog of this theorem (with essentially the same proof) inter-
prets hyperstability as a property of the equivalence class of a set of
strategy proﬁles for the equivalence class of the game; i.e. G¤ represents
the equivalence class of game G and a hyperstable set for G¤ represents
the equivalent hyperstable sets for games equivalent to G¤.ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 5
RS£N. Let Gn and Gn be the extensions of ˆ Gn from pro-
ﬁles of mixed strategies to player n’s expected payoﬀs from
pure and mixed strategies; viz., player n’s expected payoﬀs







m6=n ¾m(tm), and Gn : Σ ! R
where Gn(¾) = ¾0
nGn(¾). Note that Gn(¾) does not depend
on ¾n but Gn(¾) does.
A proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ is an equilibrium of G if each player’s
strategy ¾n is an optimal reply to others’ strategies; that is,
[¿n ¡ ¾n]0Gn(¾) 6 0 for all ¿n 2 Σn. Equilibria are charac-
terized as ﬁxed points of a map as follows (G¨ ul, Pearce, and
Stacchetti [11]). Let rn : RSn ! Σn be the piecewise-aﬃne
map that retracts each point in RSn to the point of Σn nearest
in Euclidean distance; i.e. rn(zn) is the unique solution r 2 Σn
to the variational inequality [¿n¡r]0[zn¡r] 6 0 for all ¿n 2 Σn.
Let Z =
Q
n RSn and deﬁne r : Z ! Σ via r(z)n = rn(zn) for
each player n, and w : Σ ! Z via wn(¾) = ¾n+Gn(¾). Then
¾ is an equilibrium iﬀ ¾ = [r ± w](¾). Hence the equilibria
are the ﬁxed points of the map Φ ´ r ± w : Σ ! Z ! Σ. An
equilibrium component is a maximal connected set of equilib-
ria and thus compact. Each component of ﬁxed points of the
permuted map F ´ w ± r : Z ! Σ ! Z is homeomorphic to
a corresponding component of the ﬁxed points of Φ and their
indices agree (Dold [12]). In particular, the index is the local
degree of the displacement map f ´ Id ¡ F used below.
A restricted class of perturbations perturbs a player’s pay-
oﬀs from his pure strategies independently of others’ behav-
iors. For each g 2 Z deﬁne the perturbed game G © g by
(G©g)n(¾) = Gn(¾)+gn and thus (G©g)n(¾) = Gn(¾)+¾0
ngn.
Let EG = f(g;¾) 2 Z £ Σ j ¾ is an equilibrium of G © gg be
the graph of equilibria over this class of perturbations. Deﬁne
µ : EG ! Z by µn(g;¾) = ¾n+Gn(¾)+gn, and let p1 : EG ! Z
be the natural projection. Then µ is a homeomorphism; in6 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
particular, µ¡1(z) = (f(z);r(z)). Consequently, f = p1 ± µ¡1.
Moreover xA.2 shows that map f has degree +1. There exists
an orientation of EG such that the local degree of f is same
as the local degree of the projection map p1. Hence the local
degree of f and thus also the index of a component C of G is
the same as the degree of the projection map p1 on any suf-
ﬁciently small neighborhood of (0;C) in the graph EG. xA.1
presents an alternative deﬁnition of the index that depends
only on the best-reply correspondence, which is intrinsic to
a game independently of the map characterizing equilibria as
ﬁxed points.
As described in x1, a proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ for game G induces
an equivalent proﬁle ¾¤ 2 Σ¤ of G’s reduction G¤. Let An
be the matrix whose columns are the pure strategies in Sn
represented as mixed strategies in Σ¤n. Then ¾¤n = An¾n
and Gn(¾) = A0
nG¤n(¾¤). A proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ is an equilibrium of
G if and only if the equivalent proﬁle ¾¤ = (An¾n)n2N is an
equilibrium of G¤.
3. Proof of the Theorem
We now prove the two parts of Theorem 1.1. Theorem 3.1
extends to the entire class of equivalent games the implication
of nonzero index established by Ritzberger [13].
Theorem 3.1. An equilibrium component is uniformly hy-
perstable if it is essential.
Proof. Let C be an equilibrium component of game G that
is an essential component of a Nash map. Then its index
is nonzero (O’Neill [5], McLennan [14]), say d 6= 0. As
shown in xA.3, the index is invariant to addition of redun-
dant strategies, so we can assume that G is reduced. Let U
be an open neighborhood of C in Σ. We show that there
exists ± > 0 such that for each equivalent game G¤ andESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 7
each game ˜ G¤ within ± of G¤ there exists an equilibrium
of ˜ G¤ equivalent to some proﬁle in U. If necessary by re-
placing U with a smaller neighborhood, we can assume that
the only equilibria in the closure of U are in C. Because no
strategy in its boundary @U is an equilibrium, ¯ ± > 0 where
¯ ± = min¾2@U[maxn2N;s2Sn Gn
s(¾)¡¾0
nGn(¾)]. Fix ± 2 (0; ¯ ±=2).
Let G¤ be a game whose reduction is G, and let C¤ be the
equilibrium component of G¤ whose reduction is C. Let E¤ be
the graph of the equilibrium correspondence over the space of
games with the same set of strategies as in G¤. Let B¤ be the
open ball around G¤ with radius ±. Let U¤ ¾ C¤ be the set of
proﬁles of G¤ that reduce to proﬁles in U; note that a proﬁle
in @U¤ reduces to a proﬁle in @U. Then V ¤ = E¤ \(B¤ £U¤)
is an open neighborhood of (G¤;C¤) in the graph. Suppose
¾¤ 2 @U¤ and let ¾ be the corresponding proﬁle in @U. Then
there exists a pure strategy s for some player n whose pay-
oﬀ Gn
s(¾) in G from s against ¾ is greater than the payoﬀ
Gn(¾) from the reduction ¾n of ¾¤
n by at least ¯ ±. For a game
˜ G¤ 2 B¤, the payoﬀ from s against ¾¤ is strictly greater than
Gn
s(¾)¡¯ ±=2 while the payoﬀ from ¾¤
n against ¾¤ is strictly less
than Gn(¾) + ¯ ±=2. Thus, ¾¤ cannot be an equilibrium of ˜ G¤.
Therefore, ˜ G¤ has no equilibrium in @U¤. Consequently, the
projection map P ¤ : V ¤ ! B¤ is proper: the inverse image
of every compact subset of B¤ under P ¡1 is compact. xA.3
shows that the index of C and C¤ agree. Therefore, by xA.2,
the local degree of G¤ under P ¤ is d. Because P ¤ is a proper
map, this implies that the local degree of each game ˜ G¤ 2 B¤
is d (Dold [12]). Therefore the sum of the indices of equilib-
rium components of ˜ G¤ in U¤ is d. Since d 6= 0, ˜ G¤ has an
equilibrium in U¤. Since G¤ could be any game whose reduc-
tion is G and every game ˜ G¤ in its neighborhood B¤ has an
equilibrium in U¤, C is uniformly hyperstable. ¤8 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Thus those components with nonzero indices are uniformly
hyperstable, and such components exist because the sum of
the indices of all components is +1. Now we prove necessity.
Theorem 3.2. A connected uniformly hyperstable set is an
essential component.
Proof. Let C be a closed connected set of equilibria of G
and let K be the component containing it. Supposing that
Ind(K) = 0 or C 6= K, we show that C is not uniformly hy-
perstable. Fix a neighborhood U as in Corollary A.2 of the
Appendix and let ± > 0. We construct an equivalent game ˜ G
and a perturbation ˜ G± of ˜ G such that k ˜ G ¡ ˜ G±k 6 ± and the
perturbed game ˜ G± has no equilibrium equivalent to a strat-
egy proﬁle in U. The construction of ˜ G is done in three steps
(we are indebted to a reviewer for suggesting a simpliﬁcation
of Step 2).
The best-reply correspondence for game G is BR : Σ ³
Σ where BR(¾) = f¿ 2 Σ j (8n 2 N;8˜ ¿n 2 Σn) [˜ ¿n ¡
¿n]0Gn(¾) 6 0g. More generally, for ¯ ¸ 0 say that a strat-
egy ¿n of player n is a ¯-reply against ¾ 2 Σ if ¿0
nGn(¾) >
Gn
s(¾) ¡ ¯, where s 2 Sn is any optimal reply of player n
against ¾. A proﬁle ¿ is a ¯-reply against ¾ if for each n the
strategy ¿n is a ¯-reply for player n against ¾.
Step 1. First we show that without loss of generality
we can assume that G satisﬁes the following property (*):
for every neighborhood W of Graph(BR) there exists a map
h : Σ ! Σ such that:
(1) Graph(h) ½ W.
(2) For each player n the n-th coordinate map hn of h
depends only on Σ¡n.
(3) h has no ﬁxed points in U.
It suﬃces to show existence of an equivalent game G¤ satis-
fying (*).ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 9
Deﬁne G¤ as follows. Player n’s pure strategy set is S¤
n =
Sn £ Sn+1, where n + 1 is taken modulo N. For each n,
and m 2 fn;n + 1g, denote by pnm the natural projection
from S¤
n to Sm. Then the payoﬀ function from pure strate-
gies for player n is given by G¤
n(s¤) = Gn(s), where for each
m, sm = pm;m(s¤
m). In other words, n’s choice of a strat-
egy for n + 1 is payoﬀ irrelevant. Clearly G¤ is equivalent to
G. Let Σ¤
n be player n’s set of mixed strategies in the game
G¤. We continue to use pnm to denote the map from Σ¤
n to
Σm that computes for each mixed strategy ¾¤
n the induced
marginal distribution over Sm. Let p : Σ¤ ! Σ be the map
p(¾¤) = (p1;1(¾¤
1);:::;pN;N(¾¤
N)); i.e. p computes the payoﬀ-
relevant coordinates of ¾¤. Finally let P : Σ¤ £ Σ¤ ! Σ £ Σ
be the map for which P(¾¤;¿¤) = (p(¾¤);p(¿¤)). Use BR
¤ to
denote the best-reply correspondence for the game G¤. Simi-
larly C¤ denotes the component of equilibria of G¤ equivalent
to equilibria in C, and U¤ denotes the neighborhood corre-
sponding to U.
Fix a neighborhood W ¤ of Graph(BR
¤). For each ¹ > 0,
let W(¹) be the set of those (¾;¿) 2 Σ£Σ for which ¿ is a ¹-
reply to ¾ in G. Then the collection fW(¹) j ¹ > 0g is a basis
of neighborhoods of the graph of BR. Choose ¹ > 0 such that
P ¡1(W(¹)) µ W ¤. By Corollary A.2, there exists a map h :
Σ ! Σ such that Graph(h) ½ W(¹) and h has no ﬁxed points
in U. Now deﬁne the map h¤ : Σ¤ ! Σ¤ as follows: for each
n, h¤
n(¾¤) is the product distribution ¿n(¾¤)£pn+1;n+1(¾¤
n+1),






N)). By construction, each coordi-
nate map h¤
n depends only on Σ¤
¡n. We claim that the graph of
h¤ is contained in W ¤. To see this, observe ﬁrst that ¿n(¾¤) is
player n’s component of the image of (p¡n(¾¤);pn¡1;n(¾¤
n¡1))
under h. Since Graph(h) ½ W(¹), ¿n(¾¤) is a ¹-reply to10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
p¡n(¾¤). Therefore, (p(¾¤);¿(¾¤)) belongs to W(¹). Hence
(¾¤;h¤(¾¤)) 2 P ¡1(W(¹)) µ W ¤.
We ﬁnish the proof by showing that h¤ has no ﬁxed point in
U¤. Suppose ¾¤ is a ﬁxed point of h¤. Then each ¾¤
n is a prod-
uct distribution with pn;n+1(¾¤
n) = pn+1;n+1(¾¤





= hn(p(¾¤)) for each player n, which implies that p(¾¤) is a
ﬁxed point of h. Since h has no ﬁxed point in U, ¾¤ = 2 U¤.
Step 2. Let I be the interval [0;±]. We now show that
without loss of generality we can assume that G satisﬁes the
following property (**): there exists a map g : Σ ! IR, where
R =
P
n jSnj, such that:
(1) For each player n, gn depends only on Σ¡n.
(2) No proﬁle ¾ 2 U is an equilibrium of the game G ©
g(¾).
As in Step 1 we prove this by constructing an equivalent game
with the property (**). Since the payoﬀ functions are multi-
linear on the compact set Σ, there exists a Lipschitz constant
M > 0 such that kGn(¾)¡Gn(¿)k 6 Mk¾ ¡¿k for all n and
¾;¿ 2 Σ. We begin with a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 3.3. If ¿n is a ¯1-reply against ¾, k¿0
n ¡ ¿nk 6 ¯2,
k¾0 ¡ ¾k 6 ¯3 then ¿0
n is a (¯1 + M¯2)-reply to ¾ and ¿n is a
(2M¯3 + ¯1)-reply to ¾0.
Proof of the Lemma. The ﬁrst result follows directly from the
Lipschitz inequality. Let s be an optimal reply for player n
to ¾0. Then the second result follows by using the Lipschitz







Fix ´ = ±=6M. For each ¾ 2 Σ there exists an open
ball B(¾) around ¾ of radius less than ´ such that for eachESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 11
¾0 2 B(¾) the set of pure best replies against ¾0 is a sub-
set of those that are best replies to ¾. Since the set of best
replies for each player n to a strategy proﬁle is the face of Σn
spanned by his pure best replies, BR(¾0) µ BR(¾) for each
¾0 2 B(¾). The balls B(¾) deﬁne an open covering of Σ.
Hence there exists a ﬁnite set of points ¾1;:::;¾k whose cor-
responding balls form a subcover. For each ¾i, let W(¾i) be
the ´-neighborhood of BR(¾i). Let W = [i (B(¾i) £ W(¾i)).
Then W is a neighborhood of the graph of BR. From Step 1
there exists a map h : Σ ! Σ such that (1) Graph(h) ½ W;
(2) for each n, hn depends only on Σ¡n; and (3) h has no
ﬁxed point in U. If ¿ = h(¾) then there exist ¾i, ¿i such that
¾ 2 B(¾i), ¿i is a best reply to ¾i, and ¿ is within ´ of ¿i.
Therefore, the Lemma implies that ¿i is a 2M´-reply against
¾ and therefore that ¿ is a 3M´-reply against ¾.
Fix ® > 0 such that if ¾ 2 U then k¾ ¡ h(¾)k > ®. For
each n, let Tn be the simplicial complex obtained by taking
a suﬃciently ﬁne subdivision of Σn such that the diameter
of each simplex is less than both ´ and ®, and let Tn be the
set of vertices of this simplicial complex. Deﬁne T =
Q
n Tn.
We now deﬁne a game G that is equivalent to G, as follows.
For each player n the set of pure strategies is Tn. The pure
strategy tn 2 Tn is a duplicate of the mixed strategy in Σn
corresponding to the vertex tn of Tn. Since the vertices of
Σn belong to Tn, G is equivalent to G. Let Σn be the set of
mixed strategies of player n in G and let Σ =
Q
n Σn. Denote
by C and U the sets in Σ that are equivalent to C and U
respectively.
For tn 2 Tn, deﬁne X(tn) µ Σ¡n as the projection on to
Σ¡n of the inverse image of the closed star (cf. xB.1) of tn
under the map hn. And let Y (tn) be the set of ¾¡n 2 Σ¡n
such that ktn¡hn(¾)k > 2´ (recall that hn(¾) does not depend
on ¾n). Since the diameter of each simplex of Tn is less than12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
´, X(tn) \ Y (tn) = ;. Now use Urysohn’s Lemma to deﬁne
a function ¼tn : Σ¡n ! [0;1] such that ¼
¡1
tn (1) = X(tn) and
¼
¡1
tn (0) ¶ Y (tn).
Let R0 =
P
n jTnj. We now construct a map g : Σ ! IR0
with the requisite properties by ﬁrst deﬁning g on Σ and then
extending it to the whole of Σ by letting g(¾) be g(¾), where ¾
is the equivalent proﬁle in G. For each n, let fn : Σ¡n ! R be
the map deﬁned by f(¾¡n) = maxs2Sn Gn(s;¾¡n). For each n,
tn 2 Tn, ¾ 2 Σ, let gtn(¾) = ¼tn(¾¡n)[fn(¾¡n)¡Gn(tn;¾¡n)+
M´]. We ﬁrst show that g is well deﬁned, i.e. g maps each
¾ to a point in IR0. Fix n, tn, and ¾. If ¾¡n 2 Y (tn), then
gtn(¾) = 0. If ¾¡n = 2 Y (tn), then ktn ¡ hn(¾)k 6 2´. Since
hn(¾) is a 3M´-reply to ¾¡n, the Lemma implies that tn is
a 5M´-reply to ¾¡n, i.e. 0 6 fn(¾¡n) ¡ Gn(tn;¾¡n) 6 5M´.
Hence 0 6 gtn(¾) 6 6M´ = ±. Thus g is a well-deﬁned map
from Σ into IR0. Obviously the extension of g to the whole of
Σ also has norm at most ±. Also, by construction for each n,
gn depends only on Σ¡n.
To ﬁnish the proof of this step we show that if ¾ 2 U
then ¾ is not an equilibrium of G © g(¾). Suppose to the
contrary that ¾ 2 U is such an equilibrium and let ¾ be the
corresponding strategy in Σ. In the game G © g(¾), consider
the payoﬀ that player n gets when he plays a pure strategy
tn while the others play according to ¾. If ¾¡n 2 X(tn), then
his payoﬀ is fn(¾¡n) + M´; if ¾ = 2 X(tn) then his payoﬀ is
Gn(tn;¾¡n) + ¼tn(¾¡n)[fn(¾¡n) ¡ Gn(tn;¾¡n) + M´], which
is strictly smaller than fn(¾¡n) + M´ since ¼tn(¾¡n) < 1.
Obviously there exists at least one tn such that ¾¡n 2 X(tn)—
for instance any vertex of the simplex of Tn that contains
hn(¾) in its interior. Thus, the set of optimal replies to ¾ for
player n, call it T 0
n, is the set of tn’s such that ¾¡n 2 X(tn).
For each tn 2 T 0
n, there exists a simplex of Tn that contains
tn and hn(¾). Hence the distance between hn(¾) and tn isESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 13
less than ®. The support of ¾n being a subset of T 0
n, we then
have k¾n ¡ hn(¾)k 6 ®. Since we are using the l1-distance,
k¾ ¡ h(¾)k 6 ®, which is impossible. Thus, there does not
exist ¾ in U that is an equilibrium of G © g(¾).
Step 3. Suppose g : Σ ! IR has the property (**)
described in Step 2. For each ¾ 2 U there exists ³(¾) > 0
and an open ball B(¾) around ¾ such that for each ¾0 2
B(¾) and each g0 such that kg0 ¡ g(¾0)k 6 ³(¾), ¾0 is not an
equilibrium of G © g0. The balls B(¾) form an open covering
of U. Hence there exists a ﬁnite set of points ¾1;:::;¾k such
that their corresponding balls cover Σ. Let ³ = mini ³(¾i).
Construct a simplicial subdivision I of the interval I such that
the diameter of each simplex (i.e. a subinterval) is at most ³.
Using the multisimplicial approximation theorem from xB.2,
there exists a simplicial subdivision Tn of each Σn, and for
each s 2 Sn a multisimplicial approximation g¤
s : jT¡nj ! jIj
of gs that is multilinear on each multisimplex of T¡n. Let g¤ :
Σ ! jIjR be the corresponding multisimplicial map deﬁned
by the coordinate maps g¤
s. By construction, no ¾ 2 U is an
equilibrium of G © g¤(¾).
As in xB.2 let Pn be the polyhedral complex generated by
Tn, and let °n : Σn ! [0;1] be the associated convex map. For
each n let Pn be the set of vertices of Pn. Given a polyhedron
P¡n in
Q
m6=n Pm, there exists a multisimplex T¡n of T¡n that
contains it. Since g¤ is multilinear on each multisimplex, g¤
is multilinear on each polyhedron.
Consider now the equivalent game ˜ G where the strategy
set of each player n is the set Pn of vertices of the polyhedral
complex Pn. Let ˜ Σn be the set of mixed strategies of player
n in the game ˜ G. For each player n, let An be the jSnj£jPnj
matrix, where column p is the mixed strategy vector that
corresponds to the vertex p of Pn. Then the payoﬀ to player n
from a strategy vector ˜ ¾ 2 ˜ Σ is his payoﬀ in G from the proﬁle14 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
¾, where ¾m = Am˜ ¾m for each m. For each n, let Bn : P¡n !
IPn be the map deﬁned by Bn(p¡n) = A0
ng¤
n(p¡n). Consider
now the game ˜ G0 obtained by modifying the payoﬀ functions
to the following: for each player n, his payoﬀ from the pure-
strategy proﬁle p is ˜ Gn(p) + Bn;pn(p¡n). By construction ˜ G0
is a ±-perturbation of ˜ G. Let cn be the vector in RPn where
the coordinate p of cn is °n(p). For each ±0 6 ± let ˜ G±0 be the
game ˜ G0 © [¡±0c]. Then ˜ G±0 is a ±-perturbation of ˜ G.
We claim now that for suﬃciently small ±0 the game ˜ G±0 has
no equilibrium in the set ˜ U that is the neighborhood equiva-
lent to U of the equilibrium component ˜ C for ˜ G equivalent to
C. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that there is a sequence ±k
converging to zero and a corresponding sequence ˜ ¾k of equi-
libria of ˜ G±k that lie in ˜ U. For each k let ¾k be the equivalent
proﬁle in Σ. For each k and each player n, if ˜ ¿k
n 2 ˜ Σn is a












ject to An˜ ¿k
n = ¾k
n. Let Lk
n be the unique polyhedron of Pn
that contains ¾k





n;pn°n(An;pn) for all ˜ ¿k
n 2 ˜ Σn such
that An˜ ¿k
n = ¾k
n, where An;pn is the pn-th column of An and
˜ ¿k
n;pn is the probability that ˜ ¿k
n assigns to the pure strategy pn.
Moreover the construction of °n ensures that this inequality
is strict unless the support of ˜ ¿k
n is included in Lk
n. Therefore,
the equilibrium strategy ˜ ¾k
n assigns positive probability only
to points in Lk
n.
Now let ˜ ¾ be a limit of ˜ ¾k as ±k # 0 and let ¾ be the
equivalent mixed strategy. Then ˜ ¾ is an equilibrium of the
game ˜ G0. Therefore, ¾ is an equilibrium of the game G ©





m6=n ˜ ¾m;pm for each n and
s 2 Sn. By the arguments in the previous paragraph, there
exists for each n a polyhedron P ±
n 2 Pn such that ˜ ¾n assignsESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 15
positive probability only to points in P ±
n. Since each g¤
n is
multilinear on the multisimplex T¡n that contains P ±
¡n, bns =
g¤
ns(¾¡n). Thus ¾ is an equilibrium of G © g¤(¾), which is a
contradiction. Thus, for all suﬃciently small ±0 the game ˜ G±0
has no equilibrium in ˜ U. ¤
Thus the connected uniformly hyperstable sets are precisely
the essential components as stated in Theorem 1.1.
Appendix A. Index Theory
A.1. An Index Derived from the Best-Reply Corre-
spondence. We deﬁne an index for equilibrium components
using the best-reply correspondence and show that this index
coincides with the standard index constructed from a Nash
map.
Let BR : Σ ³ Σ be the best-reply correspondence for the
game G, i.e. BR(¾) = f¿ 2 Σ j (8n) ¿n 2 argmax˜ ¿n2Σn ˜ ¿0
nGn(¾)g.
The set E of equilibria of G is the set of ﬁxed points of BR;
i.e. those for which ¾ 2 BR(¾). Let C be a component of
the equilibria of G. We follow McLennan [14] in deﬁning an
index for C. Let U be an open neighborhood of C such that
its closure U satisﬁes U \ E = C. Let W be a neighbor-
hood of Graph(BR) such that W \ f(¾;¾) 2 Σ £ Σ j ¾ 2
U ¡ Ug = ;. By Corollary 2 in [14] there exists a neigh-
borhood V µ W of Graph(BR) such that if f0 and f1 are
any two maps from Σ to Σ whose graphs are contained in
V , then there is a homotopy F : [0;1] £ Σ ! Σ from f0 to
f1 such that Graph(F) ½ [0;1] £ V . By the Proposition in
[14] there exists a map f : Σ ! Σ for which Graph(f) ½ V .
Deﬁne the index IndBR(C) to be the standard index of the
restricted map f : U ! Σ. The choice of the neighborhood
V and the homotopy axiom for index ensure that this index
does not depend on the particular map f chosen to compute
the index.16 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
The index of the component C can also be deﬁned using the
index obtained from the Nash map Φ : Σ ! Σ deﬁned in x2,
which has the equilibria as its ﬁxed points. Deﬁne the G¨ ul-
Pearce-Stacchetti [11] index IndGPS(C) to be the standard
index of the component C computed from the restriction of
Φ to the map g : U ! Σ.
Theorem A.1. IndBR(C) = IndGPS(C).
Proof. For each ¸ > 0 deﬁne the game G¸ as the game where
the payoﬀ functions of all players in G are multiplied by ¸; i.e.
G¸ = ¸G. Clearly, all games G¸ have the same equilibria. For
G¸ let w¸ be the map corresponding to w in the game G, and
let g¸ = r±w¸ be the corresponding GPS map. Then for each
¸ > 0 the homotopy H : [0;1] £ Σ ! Σ, H(t;¾) = g1+t(¸¡1),
from g to g¸ preserves the set of ﬁxed points. Hence, the
index of C under g¸ is the same for all ¸. To prove Theorem
A.1 it is suﬃcient to show that there exists ¸ > 0 such that
the graph of g¸ is contained in V , the neighborhood speciﬁed
in the deﬁnition of IndBR(C). For each ¸ > 0 and ¾ 2 Σ,
w¸(¾) ´ z¸ is such that 1+¸Gn(s;¾¡n) > z¸
ns > ¸Gn(s;¾¡n)
for all n;s. Choose c(¾) > 0 such that if s is not a best
reply to ¾¡n for player n, then Gn(s0;¾¡n) ¡ Gn(s;¾¡n) >
c(¾), where s0 is a best reply for player n against ¾. Then
z¸
ns0 ¡ z¸
ns > ¸c(¾) ¡ 1 if s is not a best reply and s0 is. In
particular, if ¸ > 2=c(¾), then this diﬀerence is at least 1.
Therefore, for each such ¸, z¸ is retracted by r to a point in
BR(¾). Now choose an open ball B(¾) around ¾ in Σ such
that (i) B(¾) £ BR(¾) ½ V ; and (ii) for each n and each
s 2 Sn that is not a best reply to ¾, there is an s0 such that
Gn(s0;¾0
¡n) ¡ Gn(s;¾0
¡n) > c(¾)=2 for all ¾0 2 B(¾). Then as
before, g¸(¾0) 2 BR(¾) for each ¸ > 4=c(¾) and ¾0 2 B(¾).
The balls B(¾) for ¾ 2 Σ form an open cover of Σ. Since Σ
is compact there exists a ﬁnite set ¾1;:::;¾K 2 Σ such thatESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 17
[kB(¾k) ¾ Σ. Let ¸¤ = maxk 4=c(¾k). For each ¸ > ¸¤ the
graph of g¸ belongs to V , as required. ¤
A corollary follows from results of A. McLennan (Selected
Topics in the Theory of Fixed Points, x4.4 and Appendix E,
Economics Department, University of Minnesota, 1988, per-
sonal communication).
Corollary A.2. If C is a closed subset of a component K of
equilibria, with C = K only if Ind(K) = 0, then there exists a
closed neighborhood U of C for which, for each neighborhood
W of Graph(BR), there exists a map h such that Graph(h) ½
W and h has no ﬁxed point in U.
A.2. Equivalence of Index and Degree. Let Γ = RNjSj be
the space of all ﬁnite N-player games with a ﬁxed strategy set
Sn for each player, and S =
Q
n Sn. Let E¤ be the graph of the
Nash equilibrium correspondence over Γ and let p : E¤ ! Γ
be the natural projection. Each game G can be decomposed
uniquely as G = ˜ G©g, where for each player n and each pure
strategy s 2 Sn,
P
s¡n
˜ Gn(s;s¡n) = 0. Thus, Γ is the product
space ˜ Z £ Z of all pairs ( ˜ G;g). Deﬁne Θ : E¤ ! ˜ Z £ Z
by Θ( ˜ G;g;¾) = ( ˜ G;z) where for each player n and each s 2
Sn, zns = ¾ns + ˜ Gn(s;¾¡n) + gns. Theorem 1 of [4] shows
that Θ is a homeomorphism. The inverse Θ¡1 is deﬁned by
Θ¡1( ˜ G;z) = ( ˜ G;g;r(z)), where r(z) = ¾ is the retraction of
z to Σ and gns = zns ¡ ¾ns ¡ ˜ Gn(s;¾¡n) for all n and s 2 Sn.
Furthermore, Θ extends to a homeomorphism between the
one-point compactiﬁcations, call them E
¤
and Γ, of E¤ and Γ
respectively; and p±Θ¡1 is homotopic to the identity map on
Γ. Thus, the map p ± Θ¡1 has degree +1. We can therefore
orient E¤ such that the projection map p : E¤ ! Γ has degree
1. Given a game G and a component C of the game, choose a
neighborhood U of f( ˜ G;g)g £ C in the graph that is disjoint
from the other components of equilibria of G (viewed as a18 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
subset of E¤). The degree of C, denoted deg(C), is the local
degree of ( ˜ G;g) under the restriction of p to U. Since Θ is
the identity on the ˜ Z factor, we can also deﬁne the degree
of C using Z as the space of games. Indeed given the game
G = ( ˜ G;g), let E0
G = (g0;¾) such that (( ˜ G;g0);¾) belongs
to E¤. Let µ0 : E0
G ! Z be the map µ0(g0;¾) = z, where z is
such that Θ(( ˜ G;g0);¾) = ( ˜ G;z). Then µ0 is a homeomorphism
between E0
G and Z and as before we can deﬁne the degree of C
as the local degree of the projection map from a neighborhood
of fgg £ C in E0 whose closure does not contain any other
equilibria of the game G. Obviously, these two deﬁnitions are
equivalent. If we use µ0 then the degree of C is just the degree
of g under the map f0 ´ p ± µ0¡1 from a neighborhood V of
µ0(fgg £ C) in Z, where p is the natural projection from E0
to Z. Letting µ and f be the maps deﬁned in x2, we have
µ(fgg £ C) = µ(f0g £ C), and f = f0 ¡ g. Therefore, the
degree of zero under the map f over V is the same as the
degree of g under the map f0 over V . As in x2, the degree of
zero under the map f over V is the index of the component
w(C) of the ﬁxed point set of F, which is the same as the
index of C under the GPS map Φ.
A.3. Invariance of Index and Degree. We provide a sim-
ple proof using the index deﬁned by the best-reply correspon-
dence.
Theorem A.3. The index of a component of equilibria is in-
variant under the addition or deletion of redundant strategies.
Proof. Let C be an equilibrium component of game G. It
suﬃces to show that the index of C is invariant under the
addition of redundant strategies. Accordingly, for each player
n let Tn be a ﬁnite collection of mixed strategies. Let G¤ be
the game obtained by adding the strategies in Tn as pure
strategies for n; i.e. n’s pure strategy set in G¤ is Sn [ Tn.ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 19
Let Σ¤
n be his set of mixed strategies. Let BR
¤ be the best-
reply correspondence in Σ¤. Let p¤ : Σ¤ ! Σ be the function
that maps each mixed strategy in G¤ to the equivalent mixed
strategy in G. Let ¶ : Σ ! Σ¤ be the inclusion map that
sends a point in Σ to the corresponding point on the face of
Σ¤; precisely, ¶(¾) = ¾¤, where ¾¤
ns = ¾ns for s 2 Sn and
¾nt = 0 for t 2 Tn. Obviously, ¶(¾) ½ p¡1(¾) for each ¾ 2 Σ.
Let C¤ ´ p¡1(C) be the equilibrium component of G¤ cor-
responding to C. Let U be an open neighborhood of C whose
closure is disjoint from other equilibrium components of G.
Let U¤ = p¡1(U). Choose a neighborhood W ¤ of the graph of
BR
¤ such that the index of C¤ can be computed as the sum
of the indices of the ﬁxed points in U¤ of any map h¤ whose
graph is contained in W ¤.
Let W be a neighborhood of the graph of BR such that
(¾;¿) 2 W implies p¡1(¾) £ p¡1(¿) ½ W ¤. By the deﬁnition
of IndBR(C), there exists a map h : Σ ! Σ such that (i) the
graph of h is contained in W; (ii) h has no ﬁxed points on the
boundary of U; and (iii) IndBR(C) is the index of the map h
over U. Deﬁne now a map h¤ : Σ¤ ! Σ¤ by h¤ = ¶ ± h ± p.
Then, by construction the graph of h¤ is contained in W ¤.
Moreover, h and h¤ have homeomorphic sets of ﬁxed points.
In fact, the ﬁxed points of h¤ are the image of the ﬁxed points
of h under the injective map ¶. Letting h0 = ¶±h, we have that
h = p ± h0 and h¤ = h0 ± p. Therefore, by the commutativity
property of the index (Dold [12, VII.5.9]), the index of the
map h : U ! Σ is the same as that of h¤ : U¤ ! Σ¤. Hence
IndBR¤(C¤) = IndBR(C). ¤
Appendix B. Multisimplicial Complexes
B.1. A Multisimplicial Approximation Theorem. We
establish a multilinear version of the Simplicial Approxima-
tion Theorem. This result may be known but we found no20 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
reference. We begin with some deﬁnitions; see Spanier [15]
for details.
A set of points fv0;:::;vng in RN is aﬃnely independent
if the equations
Pn
i=0 ¸ivi = 0 and
P
i ¸i = 0 imply that
¸0 = ¢¢¢ = ¸n = 0. An n-simplex K in RN is the convex
hull of an aﬃnely independent set fv0;:::;vng. Each vi is a
vertex of K and the collection of vertices is called the vertex
set of K. Each ¾ 2 K is expressible as a unique convex
combination
P
i ¸ivi; and for each i, ¾(vi) ´ ¸i is the vi-th
barycentric coordinate of ¾. The interior of K is the set of ¾
such that ¾(vi) > 0 for all i. A face of K is the convex hull
of a nonempty subset of the vertex set of K.
A (ﬁnite) simplicial complex K is a ﬁnite collection of sim-
plices such that the face of each simplex in K belongs to K,
and the intersection of two simplices is either empty or a face
of each. The set V of 0-dimensional simplices is called the
vertex set of K. The set given by the union of the simplices
in K is called the space of the simplicial complex and is de-
noted jKj. For each ¾ 2 jKj, there exists a unique simplex
K of K containing ¾ in its interior; deﬁne the barycentric co-
ordinate function ¾ : V ! [0;1] by letting ¾(v) = 0 if v is
not a vertex of K and otherwise by letting ¾(v) be the corre-
sponding barycentric coordinate of ¾ in the simplex K. For
each vertex v 2 V , the star of v, denoted St(v), is the set of
¾ 2 jKj such that ¾(v) > 0. The closed star of v, denoted
ClSt(v), is the closure of St(v).
A subdivision of a simplicial complex K is a simplicial com-
plex K¤ such that each simplex of K¤ is contained in a sim-
plex of K and each simplex of K is the union of simplices in
K¤. Obviously jKj = jK¤j. We need the following theorem on
simplicial subdivisions for our Approximation Theorem below
(Spanier [15],x3).ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 21
Theorem B.1. For every simplicial complex K and every
positive number ¸ > 0 there exists a simplicial subdivision
K¤ such that the diameter of each simplex of K¤ is at most ¸.
A multisimplex is a set of of the form K1£¢¢¢£Km, where
for each i, Ki is a simplex. A multisimplicial complex K is
a product K1 £ ¢¢¢ £ Km, where for each i, Ki is a simplicial
complex. The vertex set V of a multisimplicial complex K
is the set of all (v1;:::;vm) for which each vi is a vertex of
Ki. The space of the multisimplicial complex is
Q
i jKij and
is denoted jKj. For each vertex v of K, the star of v, St(v),
is the set of all ¾ 2 jKj such that for each i, ¾i 2 St(vi). The
closure of this set is ClSt(v). A subdivision of a multisim-




where for each i, K¤
i is a subdivision of Ki. In the following,
K is a ﬁxed multisimplicial complex and L is a ﬁxed simplicial
complex.
Deﬁnition B.2. A map f : jKj ! jLj is called multisimpli-
cial if for each multisimplex K of K there exists a simplex L
in L such that:
(1) f maps each vertex of K to a vertex of L;





By property (1) vertices of K are mapped to vertices of L.
Therefore, for each ¾ 2 jKj, f(¾) is an average of the values
at the vertices of K. Since the simplex L is a convex set,
the image of the multisimplex K is contained in L. If K is
a simplicial complex then Deﬁnition B.2 coincides with the
usual deﬁnition of a simplicial map. In this special case the
image of a (multi)simplex K under f is a simplex of L, which
is not necessarily true in general.22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Deﬁnition B.3. Let g : jKj ! jLj be a continuous map. A
multisimplicial map f : jKj ! jLj is a multisimplicial approx-
imation to f if for each ¾ 2 jKj, f(¾) is in the unique simplex
of L that contains g(¾) in its interior.
We could equivalently deﬁne a multisimplicial approxima-
tion by requiring that for each ¾ and each simplex L of L, if
g(¾) 2 L then also f(¾) 2 L. We now prove a Multisimplicial
Approximation Theorem.
Theorem B.4. Suppose that g : jKj ! jLj is a continuous
map. Then there exists a subdivision K¤ of K and a multi-
simplicial approximation f : jK¤j ! jLj of g.
Proof. The collection fg¡1(St(w)) j w is a vertex of Lg is an
open covering of jKj. Let ¸ > 0 be a Lebesgue number of this
covering; i.e. every subset of jKj whose diameter is less than
¸ is included in some set of the collection. By Theorem B.1,
there exists for each i a simplicial subdivision K¤
i of Ki such
that the diameter of each simplex is less than ¸=2. Then for
each vertex v of K¤, St(v) has diameter less than ¸ (recall
that we use the `1 norm). We ﬁrst deﬁne a function f0 from
the vertex set of K¤ to the vertex set of L as follows. For
each vertex v of K¤, since the diameter of St(v) is less than ¸,
there exists a vertex w of L such that g(St(v)) ½ St(w). Let
f0(v) = w. Suppose v1;:::;vk are vertices of a multisimplex
K. We claim that their images under f0 span a simplex in L.
Indeed, since the vj’s are vertices of a multisimplex, we have






Therefore, the vertices f0(vj) span a simplex in L. Since f0
maps vertices of a multisimplex to vertices of a simplex, there
exists a well-deﬁned unique multilinear extension of f0, call
it f. To ﬁnish the proof we show that f is a multisimplicialESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 23
approximation of g. Let ¾ be an interior point of a multi-
simplex K and let L be the simplex containing g(¾) in its
interior. For every vertex v of K, g(St(v)) µ St(f(v)) by con-
struction. Thus g(¾) 2 St(f(v)) for each vertex v of K. In
particular, the set of vertices ff(v) j v is a vertex of Kg span
a subsimplex L0 of L. Since f(¾) 2 L0, f is a multisimplicial
approximation of g. ¤
The proof of Theorem B.4 shows a slightly stronger result.
Let ´ = ¸=2 where ¸ is as deﬁned in the proof. If each K¤
i
is subdivision of Ki such that the diameter of each simplex
is at most ´ then g admits a multisimplicial approximation
f : jK¤j ! jLj. Thus, we obtain:
Corollary B.5. There exists ´ > 0 such that, for each sub-
division K¤ of K with the property that the diameter of each
multisimplex is at most ´, there exists a multisimplicial ap-
proximation f : jK¤j ! jLj of g.
B.2. Construction of a Convex Map on a Polyhedral
Subdivision. We describe the construction of a convex map
associated with a polyhedral reﬁnement of a simplicial subdi-
vision.
Let T be a simplicial complex obtained from a simplicial
subdivision of the d-dimensional unit simplex Σ in Rd+1. The
polyhedral complex P is derived from T as follows (Eaves
and Lemke [16]). For each simplex ¿ 2 T whose dimen-
sion is d ¡ 1, let H¿ = fz 2 Rn j a0
¿z = b¿g be the hy-
perplane that includes ¿ and is orthogonal to Σ. Then each
closed d-dimensional admissible polyhedron of P has the form
Σ \ [\¿Hp¿
¿ ] where each p¿ 2 f+;¡g and H+
¿ and H¡
¿ are
the two closed half-spaces whose intersection is H¿. Enlarge
P by applying the rule that each lower-dimensional polyhe-
dral face of an admissible polyhedron is also admissible. By
construction, the closure of each simplex in T is partitioned24 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
by admissible polyhedra of P, any two non-disjoint admis-
sible polyhedra meet in a common face that is also an ad-
missible polyhedron, and each admissible polyhedron is con-




¿¾ ¡b¿j, where the scaling factor ® > 0 is suf-
ﬁciently small that °(Σ) 2 [0;1]. Then ° is convex and piece-
wise aﬃne. In particular for any ﬁnite collection ¾1;:::;¾k
of points in Σ and nonnegative scalars ¸1;:::;¸k such that
P




i ¸i°(¾i), with the
inequality being strict if and only if there does not exist an
admissible polyhedron of P that contains all of the ¾i’s.
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